IS THE COMANCHE SAFE

AOPA Comanche Safety Review

Who Takes The Rap?

Joe Shelton

When it was proposed that the members of the ICS fund an AOPA safety review, I thought it would be a great idea and immediately contributed. Over the years I had heard the bum rap the Comanche had received from the great unwashed, and I figured this would be a great opportunity to get the facts straight. After all, I´ve been flying my Comanche for over 10 years and I know that the Comanche is a great performing yet highly underrated airplane.

Now that the report is complete, it is time for each and every Comanche pilot to spend some time understanding what the results really mean. There is good news and bad news. The good news is that the airplanes we fly do indeed have a slightly better record than the competition. In the case of the single engine Comanche not enough better to be statistically significantly (17.7% to 17.9%), but in the case of the Twin Comanche, a whole 1.4 percent better (13.3% to 14.6%).

As typical in all airplane accidents, pilot error is the major causative factor for both singles and twins. The bad news is that in both the single and twin, Comanche pilots have proven to be significantly worse in some areas than the pilots of our competitive aircraft. By a whole three percent on the single (75.7% - 72.7%) and four percent on the twin (76.3% to 72.3%). I always thought that Bonanza drivers were the ones that did dumb things and that we were, somehow, a blessed group of pilots. T´ain´t so...

But there is good news. It would be difficult to make any major changes to the fleet, but it is relatively easy to make changes to the pilots.

The facts and nothing but the facts

We could defend our pilots record by rationalizing that our pilots really are as good or better than those flying competitive aircraft, and from a common sense standpoint, there is a good reason to believe that. What that philosophy says though is that there is something or some things inherently wrong with the Comanche that causes a higher rate of pilot error. Having flown a number of aircraft types over the years, I personally am inclined to believe that the Comanche is indeed a high performance aircraft that demands a pilot be trained and experienced, but that there is nothing in particular about the Comanche that makes it more difficult to fly or that should induce pilot error any more than in any of the competitive aircraft.

So, if you assume that pilot error can be blamed on the pilot and you look at the results and especially the summaries for both the single (page 1-20) and twin Comanches (page 1-41) you can see what is not right with our flying.

For the PA-24 it seems that our overall accident rate is 1.7 times that of comparable aircraft (10.85 vs. 6.22 per 100,000 hours). For serious accidents, we have an even slightly worse ratio of 1.8 (4.25 vs. 2.34 per 100,000 hours). The twin suffers the same ignominy if less seriously; it is 1.3 times worse for general accidents (6.04 vs. 4.42 per 100,000 hours) and also for serious accidents (1.94 and 1.54 per 100,000 hours).

All of those statistics are scary! But once you look at what areas are the most causative and what stands out against competitive aircraft models, it shows that we do pretty much same dumb things as other pilots - only in some areas we do them substantially more often.

It should be noted, that I am going to intentionally ignore categories where the numbers are single digit simply because there aren´t enough to make the category statistically significant.

Where are the Problems?

Here is an irony. Our single pilots seem to be able to take off, climb, descend, fly an approach, maneuver, and land with about the same percentage of accidents as the competitive pilots. All those areas that required active piloting. But we are 16% more likely (page 1-3) to have a pilot induced accident in cruise! In cruise? As you´ll see later there are probably two significant reasons this is so high.

The twin drivers also don´t even fair that well in cruise (page 1-23). They are 36 % worse than comparable pilots of competitive aircraft. At the same time, our twin drivers also seem to get into more trouble during take-off (50% worse). These numbers are somewhat mitigated by the fact that our twin pilots have less accidents in both the approach and landing phases of flight.

Weather and night flying seemed to be where our singles were really differentiated from other aircraft types. In EVERY category of IMC and/or night, our single pilots have proven that they are significantly more likely to get into an accident that our competitive aircraft´s pilots. We are talking on the order of TWO to THREEÊtimes as likely! That is horrendous!

This is one category where it is possible that the random layout of instruments inherent in the early Comanches and the possibility that our pilots are flying older and ill equipped aircraft in the clouds may have something to do with the results.

But whatever the factors that cause it, it seems our single engine Comanche pilots either don´t get enough training or don´t get enough practice flying in difficult conditions. Or both. Other than the panel, I doubt that there is anything in particular about the Comanche that makes it more difficult to fly (e.g. less stable, etc.). So these statistics imply that we simply don´t know how to fly in the clouds and/or at night as well as our counterparts.

There is some good news, our twin pilots are better than the competition in both all IMC and IFR flights during the day. By night, they are worse in total by about 12%, but consistent with the daytime record, better than the competition in night IMC and IFR. There is no available information to help discern why our twin pilots flying better at night in instrument (IMC/IFR) conditions but worse over all. I suspect that it is possible that the higher night overall rate might be caused by non instrument rated pilots. But there is nothing to support that theory.

Then there is the issue of fuel. Fuel exhaustion is an endemic problem for the whole GA fleet, but both single and twin Comanches stand out from the competition in this area (pages 1-16 & 1-36). It seems we have fuel problems at an alarming rate. Considering the simplicity of the Comanche fuel system, this must be an operator issue; we simply are not paying attention to what we are doing. One of my instructors told me something a long time ago that stays with me every time I fly. The aircraft engine burns fuel at a predictable rate. If you know how much fuel you start out with then you know when you will run out of fuel. Not how far, but when. Wishing and hoping that you can go further or longer simply doesn´t change the physics. Time is the issue. So, you should plan to be on the ground before you reach whatever time you set as reserve.

By the way, that burn rate is predicated on leaning to achieve book rates. If you don´t have the equipment that allows you to lean to the prescribed fuel flows or EGT, then you should seriously consider installing something that will.

Frankly, there is NO EXCUSE for running out of fuel in an otherwise intact aircraft. This is one category where, as pilot in command you have complete control. If you know you are running short and for whatever reason you realize that you won´t be able to reach an airport, do yourself and the rest of us a favor and take a page from the pilots of the twenties, thirties, and forties and opt for a discretionary off airport landing where you still have an engine or two that allow you to pick a reasonable landing site and fly a controlled approach.

Personally, I use one hour as my minimum for day and depending upon the situation, sometimes much longer for night flights. If I am not on the ground when I am approaching the magic time, I begin sweating (literally) and land at the nearest airport. The reason I might be so cautious with my Comanche is that not long after I purchased my Comanche I drained both tanks completely and then measured the tanks in five gallon increments so that I could always plumb my tanks during preflights to get an accurate measurement of the actual fuel on board. My right tank topped at 24 gallons and the left only took 26. So, with the supposedly 56 gallons usable, I actually only had 50 gallons usable. I was using 30 minutes as my minimum, call it seven gallons required at 65%. The reality was that I actually only had ONE of those seven gallons on board when I reached my minimum fuel. Luckily, I had never tried to cut it as close as 30 minutes.

The overall twin results were similar in their damning nature. Think about it. You might expect Twin Comanche owners to be more experienced and sophisticated pilots, yet roughly 75% of the accidents in the report were caused by errors in pilot judgment or skill! Seventy-five percent!

One other thing that seems to stand out in the report was that low time pilots or pilots with limited time in type were responsible for an enormously disproportionate share of the accidents in both singles and twins. Look at the numbers for the single. Pilots with less than 100 hours in type had almost half of the serious accidents and 41% of the minor accidents! Those with 200 to 400 hours of total time had 17% of the serious accidents and 19% of the minor accidents. To prove the point, I had 76.9 hours in Comanches when I had my one and only (knock wood) accident in any airplane - a gear up landing which was chronicled here in the Flyer about 10 years ago. (Ironically enough it happened during a day IFR training flight.)

All of this really makes the point that more initial training and recurrency training is in order for any and all of us flying any model Comanche.

It´s The Airplanes´ Fault

Yes, the results weren´t all pilot error. Our Comanches let their pilots down as well. One thing we must all recognize is that the fleet is getting older. The last Comanche came off the assembly line 25 years ago. The first, almost 40 years ago. Some Comanches have reached substantial hours. Seemingly, if we take care of our aircraft, there is nothing that stops the airframes from flying for another 40 years or more. But as each aircraft gets older, there are more and more PARTS of each airplane that need to be attended to.

You can go into the results for your specific aircraft type yourself (pages 1-19 & 1-38) to see where you might want to focus more of your maintenance attention. I guess the point is that we really do need to balance our desires to operate an inexpensive aircraft with the fact that periodically, they can be very expensive to maintain. Spend the time and money to keep your aircraft up and there is less likelihood that it will let you down.

What can we do?

First and foremost, it is important that you read and understand what the report says about your airplane type and about you as a Comanche pilot. Please, take the time to read and understand the implications of the report. In light of what the report covers, think about how your flying relates.

Second, you should book some time with your favorite CFII and go practice your IFR and general piloting skills. Think of it this way, the airline pilots are given rigorous tests a number of times each year. And yet they fly many hours throughout the year theoretically keeping their skills sharp. What makes us think that we need any less training or practice? If you always fly enough in IMC such that you arenÕt required to do an Instrument Proficiency Check (a.k.a ICC) and you never do an IPC, then you are short changing yourself and your passengers. At the minimum, you should consider having an IPC every year and having one every six month or even more often if you fly a lot of hard IFR. I complete an IPC every six months and a biennial or equivalent (e.g. new license or rating) every year. Minimum!

Third, don´t run out of fuel. How difficult can that be? I was flying an Archer returning from visiting a friend in Northern California during the fuel crisis in the early 80s. I couldn´t refuel at my departure airport and the two airports I checked on my route back were out of fuel. I figured that if I was careful I could still make it back to San Jose. About 50 miles north of San Jose I started getting nervous, so I landed at an airport about 10 miles ahead and refueled. If I remember right, I had a total of about 5 usable gallons in the tanks. I vowed then and there NEVER to get into that situation again. I haven´t and I won´t.

Fourth, assuming that new ICS members are probably also new Comanche pilots I recommend that we provide new members with a synopsis of the AOPA Comanche Safety Review along with a method for them to purchase a copy of the AOPA Safety Foundation Review.

This safety review was a fair analysis of our airplane and of us as pilots based upon recorded accidents from the NTSB. I believe we should take this report as a clarion call to each and every one of us as Comanche pilots. What this safety review says is that we are not only not as good as we could be, but we aren´t as good as other pilots flying competitive aircraft. I´d like to see the ICS spearhead a specific program encouraging even better training for our pilots (which I know the ICS has be pushing for better training). And then I´d like to see the Society commission another AOPA Safety Foundation Review.